Trouble: misreading a foe with nukes
鈥淗istory,鈥� Barbara Tuchman concluded, 鈥渋s the unfolding of miscalculation.鈥�
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance, questions have been asked about miscalculations made by Russian ruler Vladimir Putin. Did he miscalculate both the Ukrainian and Western responses to the invasion? The answer, in both instances, is a definite yes, or so it appears.
Miscalculation is particularly pertinent now that Putin has rattled his nation蘑菇视频 nuclear sabers, with the evident intent of warding off Western intervention in Ukraine.
Misreading one蘑菇视频 adversaries in the nuclear age can be suicidal. Nuclear war puts the whole world at risk. Hundreds of millions of lives would be lost in a nuclear exchange between Russia and the U.S.
Ever since the first explosion of an atomic weapon in the skies over Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945, the world has experienced several episodes of nuclear miscalculation by supposedly well-informed national leaders.
The best known of these, of course, is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in which Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev miscalculated the American response to his placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba.
President John F. Kennedy warily noted to aides in the midst of the crisis that Khrushchev was taking 鈥渙ne hell of a gamble.鈥� In a formal letter to the Soviet leader, Kennedy said he was concerned Khrushchev had failed to 鈥渃orrectly understand鈥� American resolve to see that the missiles were removed.
Tons of ink have been spilt on the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation. Less well-known is Able Archer 83. This complex of events might actually be more relevant than the Cuban Missile Crisis in appreciating the probability of misjudgment in the Ukrainian crisis.
Able Archer 83 was a NATO simulated training exercise that looked so real to Soviet leaders that things nearly spun out of control.
Nate Jones and J. Peter Scoblic examined Able Archer 83 in an April 13, 2017, article for Slate magazine. Much of what follows was gleaned from their work.
At the outset of this condensed examination of Able Archer 83, let me state that the hero of the piece 鈥� the guy who may have saved the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from destruction 鈥� was an obscure American Air Force intelligence officer who hailed from Morgantown, W.Va. His name was Leonard Peroots. We鈥檒l get to Peroots at the end of this column.
The seeds of miscalculation for Able Archer 83 were first sown, according to Jones and Scoblic, by President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s, when he took steps to enhance the options available to NATO in a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. These options, including the 鈥渇orward deployment鈥� of nuclear-armed Pershing II missiles, were designed as a display of U.S. solidarity with its European allies.
But the 鈥渙ptions looked sinister to the Soviets,鈥� write Jones and Scoblic, reflecting the opinion of a study of Able Archer 83 by the President蘑菇视频 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1990 (and released in 2013).
The level of Soviet concern went through the roof with Ronald Reagan in the White House. Labeling the Soviet Union the 鈥渆vil empire,鈥� Reagan vowed to double U.S. defense spending. In March 1983, he announced his intention to make nuclear weapons 鈥渋mpotent and obsolete鈥� by deploying a space-based defensive shield, shortened to 鈥淪tar Wars鈥� in the press.
Reagan confided to his diary that he hoped all of this would lead to a more peaceful world. The Russians didn鈥檛 see it this way. The Kremlin was spooked, so much so that in September 1983, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner, killing the 269 people on board. They mistook the airliner for a U.S. spy plane that had entered Russian air space.
Against this background NATO undertook Able Archer 83, which simulated a U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The exercise included a 鈥渂ackstory鈥� Russian invasion of Finland and Norway, and a Warsaw Pact advance on West Germany.
Eerily, in light of the present conflict in Ukraine, the exercise included the selection of a 鈥減referred city鈥� that would be destroyed first, as an Allied warning to the Soviets to back off the West German assault. The designated city: Kiev (today蘑菇视频 Ukrainian capital city Kyiv).
Soviet officials, catching wind of this and more, including new U.S.-NATO encrypted messaging rolled out for Able Archer 83, feared the worst. They were further unnerved by real-time U.S. deployment of an additional 16,000 troops to Europe. In response, the Soviets began deploying their nuclear arsenal.
Enter Leonard Peroots, then-Air Force deputy chief of staff for European intelligence, who made the 鈥渇ortuitous鈥� decision not to respond to changes in the Soviet posture. He thus allowed the Russians the time and space to climb off the nuclear 鈥渆scalator鈥� they were on.
Miscalculations is a kind of madness that no one is aware of 鈥� until it蘑菇视频 possibly too late.
Richard Robbins lives in Uniontown. He can be reached at dick.l.robbins@gmail.com.